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THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE STREET
Nirej Sekhon
ABSTRACT—Commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court’s
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago
could hamper police efforts to seize guns on the street. Many police officers
have understood the Fourth Amendment to permit stopping and frisking
anyone who appears to possess a handgun in public. But that understanding
is rooted in laws that made handgun possession a crime, the kinds of laws
struck down in Heller and McDonald. The doctrinal collision that this
appears to set up between the Second and Fourth Amendments will likely be
less meaningful on the streets—particularly in low-income, minority
neighborhoods—than commentators suggest. This is because the Fourth
Amendment affords police many opportunities to dodge the collision. The
aggressive forms of policing associated with gun interdiction in minority
neighborhoods will likely continue, but now with added constitutional
gravity. If gun rights advocates care about the fair distribution of Second
Amendment rights, they should worry about the formal and practical
opportunities the Fourth Amendment creates for the aggressive policing
associated with firearm interdiction in poor minority communities. These
advocates should make police reform and racial justice a core part of their
agenda, something they have not done to date.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Thanks to
Russel Covey, Caren Morrison, Jonathan Todres, and Deepa Varadarjan for
comments on earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of Chicago2 could
hamper police efforts to seize guns on the street.3 This would seem to be
confirmed by a spate of recent federal court opinions suggesting that Second
Amendment doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine are on a collision
course.4 The Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion” that a crime
has occurred (or is about to occur) to justify an investigative stop.5 Police
officers in some American cities have understood the Fourth Amendment to
permit stopping and frisking anyone who reasonably appears to possess a
handgun in public.6 That understanding is rooted in laws like those in

1

554 U.S. 570 (2007).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
3
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2015) (noting
that “courts are scrutinizing gun regulations with renewed vigor”); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism,
123 YALE L.J. 82, 105 (2013) (explaining that Heller and McDonald could result in a “nationalized
approach” to gun regulations that could interfere with local rules); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect
a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2008) (recognizing the
difficulty New York City may have in maintaining its gun control laws post-Heller); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated
Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that Heller may jeopardize police
efforts to get guns off the streets).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that police discovery of
a gun in a backpack did not justify a full search of the bag); Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t,
785 F.3d 1128, 1131–32 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (finding that a legally armed individual is not
“armed and dangerous” in the context of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531,
540 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that exercising the right to possess a weapon cannot justify reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 215, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a report that
the defendant was possessing a weapon did not alone justify reasonable suspicion); see also United States
v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding
that merely possessing a firearm does not justify a stop-and-frisk).
5
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
6
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 70 (2015) (noting that 8.9% of recorded stop and frisks
in New York City between 2004 and 2012 were for a “suspicious bulge”—a visual cue of gun possession);
see also Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008),
2
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Washington D.C. and Illinois that made handgun possession a crime.7 In
Heller and McDonald, however, the Court read the Second Amendment to
forbid outright handgun bans.8 The doctrinal collision that this appears to set
up will likely be less meaningful on the streets—particularly in low-income,
minority neighborhoods—than commentators suggest. This is because the
Fourth Amendment affords police many opportunities to dodge the collision.
This potential for avoidance is deeply troublesome if the Second
Amendment’s purpose is to enable citizens to resist unlawful private and
public violence.9 Principled Second Amendment advocates should oppose
gun interdiction and the aggressive forms of policing that go along with it.
That in turn means taking police reform and racial justice far more seriously
than they have to date.10
The most aggressive forms of urban gun interdiction occur in so-called
“high crime areas”11—usually poor minority neighborhoods that are
epicenters of handgun violence.12 Before Heller and McDonald, cues of
handgun possession like “furtive movement” and “waistband bulges” in a
high-crime neighborhood would provide “reasonable suspicion.”13 In the
wake of these two key cases, however, that may no longer be true. If

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html [https://perma.cc/7BNU-AFBV] (noting the
routineness of questionable stops based on gun possession).
7
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742; Heller, 554 U.S. at 571.
8
The Court forbade such laws to the extent that they prohibited handgun possession in the home. See
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. The Court has not directly addressed the scope of the Second Amendment
outside the home. Heller and McDonald, however, do strongly imply that the Second Amendment confers
protection outside the home. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has decided that the [Second] [A]mendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as
important outside the home as inside.” (citing Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012))).
9
The Supreme Court has suggested that this is in fact the point. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. The
Court’s further suggestion that there may be a constitutional right to self-defense raises the provocative
question of whether such a right extends to resisting unlawful seizures by the police. See Kindaka Sanders,
A Reason to Resist: The Use of Deadly Force in Aiding Victims of Unlawful Police Aggression, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 695, 716 (2015).
10
See Adam Winkler, The Right to Bear Arms Has Mostly Been for White People, WASH. POST (July
15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/15/the-right-to-bear-arms-hasmostly-been-reserved-for-whites/?utm_term=.734b238320b1 [https://perma.cc/L8C2-55RB]. Second
Amendment activists’ lack of attention to race is ironic given its historic centrality in the debates about
gun rights and restrictions. See Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/
[https://perma.cc/4SNV-ZUF9].
11
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
12
See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 335, 339–41 (2014).
13
See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1130 (6th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical
Assessment of Police Shootings, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 189, 198 (2017).
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handguns are presumptively legal,14 police officers might not even be able to
stop individuals to check for a license.15 However, Second Amendment
advocates should not be sanguine about the likelihood that the aggressive
forms of policing associated with gun interdiction will end.
The Fourth Amendment “reasonable suspicion” standard is more
permissive of gun interdiction than it initially appears. In conjunction with
state licensing rules, the Fourth Amendment will likely accommodate
aggressive gun interdiction in many poor, minority neighborhoods. Failing
that, “consent” is another Fourth Amendment doctrine that is unaffected by
the Second Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits suspicionless
searches if the subject consents.16 However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted “consent” to require considerably less of police than the word’s
ordinary meaning would suggest—the police may use coercive power to
coax a “yes” from targets.17
The formal latitude created by Fourth Amendment doctrine only begins
to suggest the practical latitude police enjoy on the streets. We tend to
conceptualize Fourth Amendment doctrine as prospectively regulating
police authority. In practice, however, these doctrines are after-the-fact
narrative resources that can be used as post hoc rationales for conduct that
police think a court might view as unconstitutional. Because Fourth
Amendment regulation of street policing depends heavily on such accounts
of what did (and did not) transpire, police enjoy considerable opportunity for
subterfuge. Heller and McDonald will do little to change this. If Second
Amendment rights are to be fairly distributed, then gun rights advocates must
address this reality and make police reform a core part of their agenda.
This Essay identifies the formal and practical opportunities that the
Fourth Amendment creates for police to evade the Second Amendment on
the streets, particularly in low-income, minority communities. Parts I
through III discuss how the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion
14

The Supreme Court has not yet expressly held that the Second Amendment makes this true in
public, but many states have enacted permissive gun laws that do. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-73(b)
(2013) (allowing licensed individuals to carry unloaded handguns in their vehicles); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3102(A)(2), 13-3111(A) (2014) (no permit required for open or concealed carry provided
that certain age and other restrictions satisfied); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-126(g) (2016) (allowing various
forms of firearms possession even without a carry license); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68(C)(1)
(LexisNexis 2007) (defining possession of a firearm as including open concealed or concealed carry);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.15(b)(6) (West 2017) (defining carrying a gun as including open or
concealed carry).
15
Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless stop
of motorist for license check).
16
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002).
17
See Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in
Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 114 (2011).
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standard, Terry frisks,18 and the definition of consent permit such evasion.
Part IV sums up how police can use these Fourth Amendment rationales as
after-the-fact justifications for stops and searches that threaten Second
Amendment rights.
I.

EXPERTISE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION

The Second Amendment tolerates some criminal regulation of gun
possession.19 Even in states with permissive gun laws, there are usually some
restrictions. For example, many states require a license and prescribe
whether handguns may be concealed in public.20 Violating these rules may
be a misdemeanor criminal offense or an infraction.21 For those with previous
felony convictions, possessing a firearm is generally a felony.22 These rules
may allow the police to circumvent Second Amendment protections, at least
in so-called “high-crime” neighborhoods.
Most gun fatalities are handgun induced,23 and are concentrated
amongst poor people of color.24 From the little data available, illegal firearms
likely play an outsized role in these fatalities.25 That may reflect higher rates
of illegal firearm ownership in poor minority communities than in other
communities, but it is difficult to be certain. For years, the National Rifle
Association has successfully thwarted public health and other demographic
research about guns and gun violence.26 The paucity of available research
18

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2007).
20
See Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 918–927 (2015) (summarizing different states’ approaches).
21
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-84(a) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(M) (2014); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-132(b) (2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 2017).
22
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-131 (2017).
23
MICHAEL PLANTY & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FIREARM VIOLENCE, 1993–2011, 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA6Q-R4UF].
24
See id. at 5.
25
Cf. Philip J. Cook et al., Sources of Guns to Dangerous People: What We Learn by Asking Them,
79 PREVENTIVE MED. 28, 35 (2015) (survey of ninety-nine “criminally active gun-involved” men
admitted to Cook County jail); Anthony Fabio et al., Gaps Continue in Firearm Surveillance: Evidence
from a Large U.S. City Bureau of Police, 10 SOC. MED. 13, 20 (2016) (79% of criminal perpetrators in
Pittsburgh “are connected to firearms for which they are not the legal owner[s]”); see also Peter Hermann
et al., One Illegal Gun. 12 Weeks. A Dozen Criminal Acts. The Rapid Cycle of Gun Violence. WASH. POST
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/one-gun-the-rapid-cycle-of-gunviolence/?utm_term=.ad8d08befef2 [https://perma.cc/F9E9-RM98] (noting that many high-crime areas
are plagued with the sharing of illegal firearms within gangs).
26
See Todd C. Frankel, Why the CDC Still Isn’t Researching Gun Violence, Despite the Ban Being
Lifted Two Years Ago, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/
wp/2015/01/14/why-the-cdc-still-isnt-researching-gun-violence-despite-the-ban-being-lifted-two-yearsago/?utm_term=.72f2378a467c [https://perma.cc/AT5F-HTAW]; Sheila Kaplan, Congress Quashed
19
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funding has caused many urgent (and obvious) questions regarding guns to
remain unanswered. Courts are sometimes willing to rely on police expertise
to fill this kind of data gap,27 but police sampling is problematic and will be
skewed by the police’s frequent contact with lawbreakers.
When run through the filter of police expertise, the geographic
concentration of handgun fatalities may undo any presumption of lawfulness
that the Second Amendment creates. This seems especially likely in poor
minority neighborhoods. Courts tend to credit police expertise with regard
to whether an area is “high-crime.”28 The claim of expertise is usually based
on officer testimony regarding personal experience in a place or with
particular categories of misconduct.29 For example, an officer with homicide
experience might offer testimony that most of the handgun fatalities in a
particular neighborhood involved unregistered firearms. An officer with gun
interdiction experience might make even broader generalizations about guns
in a particular neighborhood. In the absence of meaningful data about rates
of licensed and unlicensed gun ownership in an area, it is difficult to
challenge those kinds of claims. If courts in a particular jurisdiction are
persuaded that unlicensed firearms are pervasive in a neighborhood, they are
likely to credit police officers’ assumptions that any given handgun there is
likely illegal. That would, in effect, permit police to continue acting on cues
of handgun possession as if handguns were legislatively forbidden.
There are also more individualized techniques for generating
reasonable suspicion regarding illegal handgun possession. For example, an
individual’s apparent youth or manner of carrying a handgun may do the
trick. Because licenses are restricted to individuals over a certain age (often
twenty-one),30 a reasonable suspicion narrative could be conjured for anyone
who appears to be younger than that age. In addition, officers who regularly
patrol a particular location may be familiar with individuals who have

Research into Gun Violence. Since Then, 600,000 People Have Been Shot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/health/gun-violence-research-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/WMC52X68].
27
See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2016–
24 (2017) (tracing the rise of police officers as expert witnesses and identifying sources of their expertise).
28
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U.
L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2008).
29
See id. at 1607–08.
30
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(b)(2) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D) (LexisNexis
2018), TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172(a)(2) (West 2016); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3(a) (2016). But see
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(b) (2015) (allowing gun licensing at 18 years old).
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noteworthy criminal histories.31 Awareness that a specific individual is a
felon coupled with indicia of gun possession would provide reasonable
suspicion.32
The most important point about reasonable suspicion may be that
officers typically craft the narrative account documenting it after the incident
is over. This creates wide latitude for subterfuge, a topic taken up in the final
Part of this Essay.
II. TERRY FRISKS
So long as an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual has or
will commit a crime, the officer can likely search that individual for a
handgun.33 Terry v. Ohio held that officers may conduct a limited scope patdown for weapons if it is reasonable to think that the suspect is “armed and
dangerous.”34 Courts have been permissive in allowing pat-downs whenever
it is plausible to think a suspect is armed. For example, in Michigan v. Long,35
the Court concluded that Terry permits officers to search a vehicle cabin for
firearms following a traffic stop because of the possibility that an
unrestrained suspect could readily retrieve and use a weapon against the
officers.36
In United States v. Robinson, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the
“armed and dangerous” standard is satisfied if an officer reasonably believes
a suspect had a gun.37 The court held that an officer need not have formed a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and then, separately, a
reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.38 This reversed a three-judge
panel’s earlier decision finding that West Virginia’s permissive handgun law
created a presumption that guns were not dangerous per se.39
Robinson suggests that, so long as police are able to generate a
reasonable suspicion narrative for a stop, they will likely have latitude to
search the individual for a gun. With the proliferation of rules governing

31

See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that an officer recognized
a felon); United States v. Collins, 650 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (S.D.W. Va. 2009), aff’d, 390 F. App’x 273
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that an officer and a felon recognized each other).
32
See Leo, 792 F.3d at 744; Collins, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
33
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
34
Id. at 27.
35
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
36
Id. at 1051–52.
37
846 F.3d 694, 707 (4th Cir. 2017).
38
Id. at 700.
39
United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 846 F.3d 694
(4th Cir. 2017).
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traffic, it is easy for police to rationalize stopping a vehicle.40 Even in the
pedestrian context it is not so difficult considering that in “high crime areas,”
running away from an officer,41 averting one’s gaze from an officer, or
staring too long at an officer, all might constitute “reasonable suspicion.”42
III. CONSENT
Police need not wait until they have reasonable suspicion that someone
has an illegal handgun before approaching and searching him. In theory, if
an individual refuses to consent, officers must discontinue the interaction and
be on their way.43 The Fourth Amendment permits “consensual
encounters”—the police may approach civilians and simply ask for
permission to search them. The Supreme Court has noted with approval that
obtaining “consent” is a common and effective investigation tactic in street
and traffic policing.44 An encounter is “consensual” if a “reasonable
[innocent] person” in the civilian’s position would have felt free to decline
the police request.45 The Court has understood this standard to permit fairly
high levels of police coercion. For example, the intimidation engendered by
an officer’s uniform and weapon does not vitiate consent,46 nor does an
individual’s ignorance as to her right to refuse the officer’s request.47 The
Court has found a search consensual when multiple officers boarded a bus
and asked to search while mere inches away from the suspect’s face.48 Many
people would likely feel intimidated by such police conduct and submit to
it.49 This is even truer for poor people of color. The standard for consent does
not require courts to consider the unique sociological circumstances that
make members of some communities more vulnerable to the police’s
persuasive power than others. This ensures that what the Fourth Amendment
considers “consent” is at distant remove from what most ordinary people
consider “consent.”
Consent doctrine also creates the opportunity for police to cast
encounters that no one understood as voluntary when they occurred as if they
40

See Long, 463 U.S. at 1035–36 (noting that officers investigated car that was “traveling erratically
and at excessive speed.”).
41
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
42
See Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2008–2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133,
176.
43
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983).
44
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973).
45
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002).
46
See id. at 204–05.
47
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
48
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–200.
49
See id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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were. Including a few words in a police report to the effect that the officers
asked for permission to conduct a search can make a mandatory request
appear consensual. “Consent,” much like “reasonable suspicion,” is a post
hoc narrative resource rather than an a priori restraint. It’s all in the telling.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT AS NARRATIVE RESOURCE
Each of the Fourth Amendment justifications discussed above is
ultimately a narrative resource available to officers following an arrest. This
is typically when an officer puts pen to paper and creates a formal account
of an encounter, identifying the specific rationales for the stop and search.50
For the myriad encounters in which there is no arrest, citizens will have little
incentive to litigate any perceived constitutional violations, and this is even
more true for those who live in neighborhoods where gun interdiction efforts
are most vigorous.51 Even though officers are obliged to uphold the
Constitution whenever they search or seize, it will be the rare case in which
they have to provide a formal account of the constitutional rationales for their
choices.
Whether an investigative stop was supported by consent or reasonable
suspicion are factual questions for a judge. Both explicitly call for an analysis
of the facts from the police officer’s perspective—would a reasonable officer
have believed there was consent or evidence of criminal wrongdoing?52 This
leaves police officers with considerable latitude to embellish or even
manufacture facts. Doing so will not seem terribly ignoble when contraband
was actually found, inevitably true where suppression is sought. Officers will
typically have the narrative advantage over defendants. Not only are the
former more seasoned witnesses than the latter, but they also have the
credibility of their office.
CONCLUSION
Second Amendment advocates’ victories in the Supreme Court may not
amount to much on the street. McDonald and Heller have changed the
constitutional landscape in principle and have also set up an apparent
doctrinal collision with the Fourth Amendment. Police will no longer be able
to stop suspects based on cues of handgun possession. That collision,
however, even if resolved in favor of Second Amendment rights, will likely
fail to sufficiently protect gun owners in poor, minority neighborhoods. If

50

See Nirej Sekhon, Mass Suppression: Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51 GA. L. REV.
429, 432 (2017).
51
See id. at 431–32.
52
Id. at 450, 452–53.
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gun rights advocates care about the fair distribution of Second Amendment
rights, they should be concerned about the formal and practical opportunities
the Fourth Amendment creates for aggressive firearm policing. The Fourth
Amendment is sieve-like when it comes to police regulation; most
misconduct passes through without any judicial involvement or recognition.
That reality, due to the intersection of the Second and Fourth Amendments,
now has added constitutional gravity.
Aggressive policing in high-crime neighborhoods burdens innocent
residents of those neighborhoods, who are more likely to be hassled by police
than similarly situated residents of other neighborhoods.53 This is ironic
because residents of high-crime neighborhoods likely have more reason to
avail themselves of the Second Amendment right to bear arms than those
who live in safer neighborhoods. Second Amendment advocates should take
note of this and include police reform and racial justice in their core agenda.

53

The Court has recognized as much. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2000) (finding
that while individuals in high-crime areas may have innocent reasons for fleeing police, such as fear of
law enforcement, officers and courts may still take into account such conduct when determining
reasonable suspicion).
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